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BRENT M. S. CAMPNEY
“Standing in the Crater of
a Volcano”
Anti-Chinese Violence and International Diplomacy in the American West
ABSTRACT This study investigates anti-Chinese violence in the American West—focusing primarily on
events in the Arizona Territory between 1880 and 1912—and the role of diplomatic relations between the
United States and China in tempering the worst excesses of that violence. Recent scholarship asserts that
the Chinese rarely suffered lynching and were commonly targeted for other types of violence, including
coercion, harassment, and intimidation. Building on that work, this study advances a definition of racist
violence that includes a broad spectrum of attacks, including the threat of violence. While affirming that
such “subtler” violence achieved many of the same objectives as the “harsher” violence, it seeks to
explain why whites used such radically different and less openly violent methods against this minority and
explains why this difference mattered. Using these insights to interrogate the complex relationship
between the United States and China, this essay shows that Chinese diplomatic influence stifled anti-
Chinese mob violence by white Americans. It argues that this relationship denied white racists the same
agency against the Chinese immigrants as they possessed against other racial and national minorities and
thus forced them to “choose” the “subtler” acts of violence against this group rather than those usually
employed against these others. KEYWORDS: Chinese immigration, white supremacy, racist violence,
lynching, American West, Arizona Territory, international diplomacy
“T
HE CHINESE MUST go,” declared the Daily Tombstone in 1886, in a well-worn
summation of anti-Chinese sentiment in the American West. Those white
Americans who allowed the Chinese to enter or to remain in the country, it
added, “might as well try to prevent the water from flowing over Niagara [F]alls as to stem
the current of Anti-Chinese opinion.” Those in the southeastern Arizona Territory were
eager to do their part to stem the current and to “rid Tombstone and Cochise county from
the blighting Chinese curse.”1 In a later dispatch, the Tombstone—again demonstrating its
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ability to harness metaphors—warned that the Chinese and any white person who sup-
ported them were “standing in the crater of a volcano.”2 The anti-Chinese sentiment
revealed in the Tombstone provides a sobering portrait of some attitudes held by whites
across the West at that time. It also offers an opportunity to investigate not only that
sentiment’s role in stoking anti-Chinese violence there, but also the role of diplomatic
relations between the two countries in tempering the worst excesses of that violence.
While this essay will focus on events in the Arizona Territory, it begins with an overview
of anti-Chinese sentiment across the American West and assesses the relevant
scholarship.
During the study period, anti-Chinese sentiment was widespread in the American
West. It had developed over three decades largely in response to two significant events.
The first was the gold rush, which began in 1849, attracted thousands of Chinese im-
migrants to California, and prompted thereafter the passage of state laws targeting them.
The second was the signing of the Burlingame Treaty in 1868, which affirmed the terri-
torial integrity and national sovereignty of China, provided for reciprocal free immigration
and emigration, asserted “the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions” common to
citizens of other countries with “most favored nation” status, and expanded trade oppor-
tunities between the two countries.3 Given its openness to immigration, this treaty greatly
amplified anti-Chinese sentiment in the West, leading to an ever-quickening series of
restrictions on immigration by the Congress.
Beginning in 1875, the Page Act—the first significant challenge to the Burlingame
Treaty—prohibited immigrants from “China, Japan, or any Oriental country, without their
free and voluntary consent” (a provision also in the Burlingame Treaty) or, if female, “for
the purposes of prostitution.” This act placed departure and arrival controls on such
immigrants and assigned financial penalties or prison terms on those involved in such
offences.4 In 1880, the Angell Treaty received Chinese recognition of America’s right to
“regulate, limit, or suspend” (but “not absolutely prohibit”) the immigration of Chinese
laborers if it became necessary in the judgment of the U.S. government. However, it
explicitly exempted Chinese “teachers, students, merchants” and “Chinese laborers who
are now in the United States,” and it accorded them “all the rights, privileges, immunities,
and exemptions” consistent with China’s most-favored-nation status.5 Less than two years
later, but consistent with the provisions in the Angell Treaty, the Chinese Restriction Act
suspended the future immigration of Chinese skilled and unskilled laborers for ten years.
For those protected by that Treaty, however, the Act required the U.S. authorities to
register all Chinese travelers entering or leaving the country and to provide them with
certificates identifying their vocational status. For those who violated the Treaty, the Act
specified penalties.6 However, it did little to diminish anti-Chinese sentiment among the
white citizens in the West or for their legislators demanding far more stringent restric-
tions on immigration.
The various reasons for this anti-Chinese sentiment were later articulated by prominent
contemporaries and by historians. Responding to heightened fear among whites, the
California State Senate in 1876 established a Special Committee on Chinese Immigration,
which would eventually disparage every aspect of Chinese character, physiognomy, moral-
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would use to defame persons of Chinese descent. “The Chinaman has brought to us and
planted within our border all the vicious practices and evil tendencies of his home,
aggravated somewhat, perhaps, by the circumstance that he has lost what little restraint
his home government imposed upon him, without submitting to the restraint of ours,”
explained the committee’s published report in 1878. “Their civilization is so ancient that it
has become rotten.”7
In his papers, Horace Davis—a prominent businessman, U.S. Representative from
California from 1877 to 1881, and leading Republican opponent of Chinese immigra-
tion—captured his own role in roiling the racist mood, campaigning against Chinese
immigration, and promoting the legislation restricting the Chinese in 1882.8 In 1878,
he delivered a speech in the House of Representatives in which he charged that the
“Chinaman” was spreading like a pestilence and that “to-day he is found in every village,
in every mining camp, utterly an alien in the body-politic, and like some foreign substance
in the human body, breeding fever and unrest till that system is relieved of its unwelcome
presence.” Davis worried that “so large a foreign body unable or unwilling to assimilate to
our ways renders them a dangerous element to society and a grave peril to the State;
second, that their presence is a menace to free labor.”9 Sharing Davis’s views, an editor in
the late 1870s remarked that the Chinese “are rapidly absorbing industries that should be
in the hands of white men and women.”10
Besides this perceived economic threat, whites feared the disproportionately male com-
position of the Chinese residents in the United States, the result of a mix of factors: the
anticipated temporary nature of their migration, the Chinese cultural prohibition against
the migration of women and children, and the aggressive effort by American policymakers
limiting the immigration of Chinese women who would deliver children entitled to U.S.
birthright citizenship. Beth Lew-Williams addressed some of these factors in her descrip-
tion of the many young Chinese men who originated in Guangzhou (Canton) and
migrated to America in the nineteenth century. When they left their villages in southeast
China in the 1860s en route to their point of departure in Hong Kong, they were “part of
a wave of predominately young, male, lower-middle-class migrants venturing out of
Guangdong Province in search of opportunity. For generations this same demographic
group had left home to seek work in neighboring towns, provinces, or nations. Now with
the help of new transportation lines, they crossed the Pacific.”11
In 1909, Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada added another reason that white fears
toward the Chinese persisted into the early twentieth century. In “A Western View of the
Race Question,” he lamented that—try though they might—whites had not succeeded in
entirely shutting out these immigrants and, consequently, they worried that migrants
from China and across Asia might eventually overrun the West and seize it from its white
occupiers, just as whites had wrested the West from ethnic Mexican and Indian peoples
earlier (see Figure 1). “Confronting our Pacific Coast lies Asia, with nearly a billion people
of the yellow and brown races, who, if there were no restrictions, would quickly settle upon
and take possession of our entire western coast and inter-mountain region,” he wrote.
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Periodically, therefore, whites in the West violently asserted their anti-Chinese senti-
ment. In 1871, rioters attacked the Chinese in Los Angeles in a massacre that claimed the
lives of eighteen immigrants.13 In 1880, a mob annihilated nearly every house and busi-
ness in the Chinese quarters within Denver, Colorado, and lynched a launderer named
Sing Lee. In 1885, a white mob rampaged against the Chinese in Rock Springs, Wyoming,
killing twenty-eight, wounding fifteen, expelling five hundred or so, and torching seventy-
nine of their homes and businesses.14 Throughout, whites instituted sundown practices
that banished the Chinese, keeping them from living in or even visiting such towns.
Figure 1. In this 1879 cartoon, Thomas Nast epitomized the fear among whites that Chinese immigrants
would overrun the West and seize it from its white occupiers, as whites had wrested it from Indians. The “Red
Gentleman” suggests this as he whispers in the ear of the “Yellow Gentleman” that “Pale face” (the white
inhabitant) was afraid that the Chinese would “crowd him out, as he did me.” Above their heads is a drawing
of a train from the eastern United States chasing an Indian west (“Go West!”) in previous decades; beneath it
is the drawing of a Chinese man chasing a now mangled train back east (“Go East”).
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Occasionally, they resorted to racist violence to achieve or enforce these practices. During
a gold boom in Quigley, Montana, in 1896, whites warned Wong Ying, the only Chinese
resident, that theirs would be an all-white town. When he refused to leave, a mob burned
his house and shot him when he ran outside. “His death was at the hands of men who did
not want him or any other Chinaman in the camp.”15
In her study, which reached into the early twentieth century, Jean Pfaelzer found that
the bulk of anti-Chinese violence in the West occurred in the four decades after the onset
of the Gold Rush.16 Lew-Williams later argued that the 1880s constituted its high tide.
“Over a period of eighteen months in 1885 and 1886, Chinese across the American West
experienced violence on an unprecedented scale.” After demonstrating that the series of
riots and expulsions had wrought profound “collective and cumulative effects” on the
Chinese, she concluded that this outbreak reflected an explosion of barely suppressed
fury among whites over the failure of the 1882 Chinese Restriction Act to dampen what
they viewed as the deleterious effects of the Chinese already in the country or those still
entering as undocumented aliens, often through Mexico. To the Chinese, she observed, it
“seemed a coordinated attack” toward a specific objective. Ah Hung, a Chinese resident of
California, declared as much in early 1886: “The Chinese . . . have come to the conclusion
Figure 2. This Thomas Nast cartoon from 1869 provides an ironic glimpse at the “encouragement” provided
by whites on the West Coast to Chinese immigration in that period, encouragement that came in the form of
violence aimed at curbing their arrival. Reflecting white perceptions of Chinese men as sexually perverse, the
image portrays the white man as powerful and manly and the Chinese man as weak and feminized.
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that the present movement is different from preceding ones, that it will prove to be
a permanent one.” The violence had convinced Hung that “[the people of the] Pacific
Coast are earnest in their desire not only to restrict [us] coming into the country, but to
expel those already here.” Hung understood immigration restriction and violent expulsion
as two prongs of a single attack. Together, law and violence sought to deny the Chinese any
place in America (Figure 2).17
For the Chinese in the West, “standing in the crater of a volcano” meant enduring mob
violence of all types. Yet scholars like Pfaelzer and Lew-Williams assert that the Chinese
who suffered mob violence there rarely became victims of the targeted violence against
individuals so characteristic of the attacks on African American and ethnic Mexican
victims. Instead, they argue, the Chinese usually confronted mass expulsions. In her
study, Pfaelzer identifies over two hundred “roundups” in California between 1849 and
1906.18 Lew-Williams observes that, although lynchings occurred, whites more commonly
“drove them out using subtler forces of coercion, harassment, and intimidation. They
posted deadlines for the Chinese to vacate town, leaving unspoken the consequences of
noncompliance. They locked up leaders of the Chinese community and watched as the rest
fled. They called for boycotts.” Because of these less violent approaches to racist violence
by white mobs, she concludes that historians underestimate not only the scope and scale
of the violence against the Chinese but the significance of the threat of violence as well.
“When we use black oppression and Indian extermination to define racial violence,” she
continues, “Chinese expulsions seem insignificant. Or, even more accurately, they appear
not to be violent at all.”19
This study agrees with Lew-Williams’s assertion that, to be useful, the definition of
“racist violence” must encompass both violence of all types and the threat of violence.20 It
also concurs with her view that the types of often lethal violence used against other racial
groups help conceal the significance of the threat of violence deployed against the Chi-
nese. Crucially, this study asserts that these differences are not only significant, as Lew-
Williams argues, but they are dependent as well upon the prevailing assumption that the
white perpetrators involved enjoyed unfettered agency.
While Lew-Williams was correct in arguing that the more common use of “subtler
forces” achieved many of the same objectives as the more restrictive use of the harshest
ones, she did not explain why whites “decided” to use such radically different—and less
openly violent—methods against this racial minority. Nor did she address why this dif-
ference matters. Building on her foundational work, this essay attempts to answer these
questions. It interrogates two of the many strengths of her book—the focus on the inter-
ests of the U.S. government in securing and eventually dominating the “open door” trade
relationship with China, and the recognition of the consequent leverage afforded to the
Chinese government and its diplomats in their negotiations with their counterparts in
Washington, despite China being a relatively weak state during that period.21 Recent work
by historians like William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, Monica Muñoz Martinez, and
myself demonstrate that the influence of foreign governments and their diplomats, and
their active intervention into incidents of racist violence against their nationals in the
United States, have played a significant, though wholly underappreciated, role in mitigat-
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Using these insights to interrogate the complex relationship between the United States
and China detailed so effectively by Lew-Williams, this essay shows that Chinese diplo-
matic influence stifled anti-Chinese mob violence by white Americans. It argues that this
relationship denied white racists the same agency against the Chinese immigrants as they
possessed against other racial and national minorities, and as a result it forced them to
“choose” the “subtler” acts of violence against this minority rather than those usually
employed against these others—although they probably would have, had they felt empow-
ered to do so.
Most of the scholarship on anti-Chinese sentiments and violence has focused on the
Pacific Coast, particularly California, which had high concentrations of Chinese, and
increasingly in areas of moderate concentrations, such as the interior mountain states
and cities like Montana and Denver.23 The lack of it in places like the Arizona Territory,
with its small Chinese population, is likely predicated on the assumption that few Chinese
immigrants “decided” to settle there, making it a useful focus for a local study or two but
of relatively little significance to the larger story of the West or of America more generally.
As suggested by the concept of sundown towns, however, this work operates on the
assumption that the Chinese did not actually “decide” not to settle in Arizona in larger
numbers; instead, they reacted to widespread banishment by whites from towns across the
territory—and, as suggested by the case in Montana, all across the West. The story of
racism and racist violence in California is obvious—the Chinese arrived, concentrated,
came into conflict with whites, and suffered ruthless, often spectacular, hostility and
oppression. By contrast, the story of racism and racist violence in Arizona is not obvious;
in fact, it does not even appear to be a story until one recognizes that absence can be a sign
of oppression—the Chinese arrived in small numbers, concentrated in a few places,
suffered banishment in town after town, and largely fled Arizona in search of more
hospitable climes.
This study focuses primarily on the Arizona Territory between 1880 and 1912, the year
it attained statehood. Geographically, it centers on the southeast and particularly on the
counties of Pima, Cochise, and Graham until 1909, when the last named was divided
longitudinally to create Greenlee County to the east and Graham to the west. Within these
counties the study targets the larger urban places like Benson, Bisbee, Clifton, Douglas,
Tombstone, and Tucson. Nevertheless, it draws upon analogous events from states else-
where in the American West when these corroborate, contextualize, or advance the story.
Organizationally, the study addresses its subject matter in three sections. In the first, it
investigates the racist fever of the 1880s—and particularly 1886—during an influx of
Chinese from California into the Arizona Territory. In the second, it assesses the role
of the Geary Act in 1892 in the facilitation of anti-Chinese intimidation during the 1890s
and 1900s. In the third, it evaluates the response of whites to another influx of Chinese
workers in late 1909 or early 1910. In terms of its sources, the study relies on local and
national newspapers, international treaties and acts of Congress, the relevant federal
censuses, the papers of Horace Davis, the aforementioned congressman from California,
and the correspondence of Carroll Cook, the racially liberal white counsel for the Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), which was known too as the Chinese Six
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Chinese in America through its cultivation of political and legal institutions domestically
and the maintenance of strong ties to China itself.24
The experiences of the Chinese in the Arizona Territory differed greatly from those in
California. Driven from gold mining in California and targeted with racist practices there,
desperate Chinese sought employment with the railroads under construction across the
West. At the time that the Southern Pacific Railroad reached Tucson in 1880, the Census
reported that there were then in the Territory 1,630 Chinese, 1,153 of whom lived in Pima
County alone. With the completion of the railroad, many of them moved on. However,
a small number remained, some finding work as cooks, waiters, domestic servants, and
section hands; others became market gardeners near the growing urban centers.25
Throughout the remainder of the territorial period, the Chinese never again numbered
more than they did in 1880. According to the federal censuses, they accounted for a total of
1,170 individuals in 1890, 1,410 in 1900, and then 1,305 in 1910 when they constituted
only 0.6 percent of the total territorial population.26 In southeastern Arizona, the Chinese
lived in very small numbers. In Pima County, they numbered 299 in 1890, 254 in 1900,
and 285 in 1910. In the same period, they declined steadily from 173 to 111 to 93 in Cochise
County; and they increased from 86 to 140 to 141 in Graham County.27 Furthermore,
given the sundown practices in effect in urban centers large and small, few Chinese
actually lived in those places. Consequently, a very small and vulnerable population was
the target of the racist sentiment documented in the area, was generally consigned to more
rural locations outside of the larger towns, and was in the realest sense standing in the
“crater of a volcano.”
Nonetheless, like whites across the West, those in the Arizona Territory were con-
sumed with fear of the Chinese in the 1880s. They erupted into paranoia in the spring
of 1886, when they became aware that the ongoing offensive against the Chinese else-
where was pushing refugees from those places into their own—a plague to be unleashed
upon innocent whites, as they saw matters. “Every town and village on the Pacific coast is
driving them away,” fretted the Daily Tombstone Epitaph in February. “If this community
will only take a common-sense view of things they will readily see that Arizona and New
Mexico are the only places left for them, and it naturally follows that here they will come,
and come in immense squads.”28 To avert this, white Arizonans undertook to banish
those Chinese immigrants who had already arrived there and, more importantly perhaps,
to establish a fearsome reputation for intolerance that would deter others from coming.
They received an assist from newspaper editors, local businessmen, and municipal poli-
ticians who whipped up anti-Chinese sentiments and exacerbated racist stereotypes to
promote their own ideological agendas, as historian Kathryn Reisdorfer demonstrates in
her study of Jerome, Arizona.29
As anti-Chinese agitation seized Willcox, the Stockman advocated the use of whatever
methods necessary to rid the town of its immigrants. “If we but work together earnestly
and intelligently,” it argued, “Willcox can be ridden of the Celestials within thirty days, and
their places filled with people of our own civilization. Then we will be happy.”30 In
Tombstone, a place that hardly needed encouragement, the Epitaph whipped up hatred
in editorials such as “The Chinese Are Coming,” a screed that praised the efforts of white
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It warned that “if something is not done, and done at once, to prevent these California
pests from entering our borders, this little city will be overrun with these people.” It added
that “immediate and decisive action is required upon the part of our citizens if they desire
to stop the influx of these barbarians.”31
In some places, whites formed Anti-Chinese Leagues that agitated against the Chinese
and devised means of expelling them. To that end, leaders in Tombstone organized
a public spectacle in March 1886. “On Saturday evening last a stand was erected facing
the Occidental Hotel, and sounds of music and the announcement that there would be an
Anti-Chinese meeting, attracted an audience of over five hundred people,” observed the
Epitaph. “A large number of ladies were present, and seemed to be heart and soul in the
movement.”32 A few weeks later, the Epitaph fawned over the group. “If it had not been
that an Anti-Chinese League had been formed in Tombstone—with the bone and sinew of
the city—to-day Tombstone (the banner city of Arizona) would have been overrun by the
pig-tailed Mongolians.” Through what it viewed as the noble “efforts of the Anti-Chinese
League fully 500 Chinamen have steered clear of this American city.”33
Led by prominent men, the Tombstone League held open meetings in which whites
hashed over what they emphatically labeled peaceful methods required to expel the Chi-
nese from their town. One Judge Peel rose to address a crowd there, explaining “that he
was heart and soul in the movement” and advocating a “boycott, because that was a peace-
ful and effectual way of making John [Chinaman] go.” After he resumed his seat to
thundering applause, another prominent citizen affirmed the judge’s sentiments, advising
listeners about “how towns in California got rid of the Chinese inhabitants simply by
resorting to the boycott.” In relating the story of a boycott in Nevada, he added that
a similar ploy in Tombstone would unify whites in their purpose, not only fostering
intra-racial goodwill but simultaneously driving away an enemy alien. In expelling Chinese
launderers from Carson, Nevada, he quipped, “a dirty shirt for about a month, [had been]
an honorable passport into good society and any parlors in that city.”34
Rallying behind such sentiments, businessmen in Tombstone pledged to neither
employ the Chinese nor patronize those who did. Although not all whites signed on,
many did.35 Several months later, the Tombstone League adopted an even uglier tone.
In its so-called Declaration of Principles, the League condemned the Chinese in racial and
moral terms, and vowed not to disband until it had achieved its purpose: “the complete
expulsion of the Chinese from Cochise County, from the present time and forever.”36
Similarly, several white men—including another judge—met in Willcox in March 1886 to
discuss “taking some action towards ridding the town of Chinese,” reported an observer.
“After considerable informal discussion it was decided to call a mass meeting for Thurs-
day next to organize for boycotting the Celestials.”37
If whites did not establish sundown bans with the founding of their towns (and some
evidence suggests they did), they probably did so during the hysteria of 1886. Although
residents decades later disavowed knowledge of exactly how or when they banned the
Chinese from Bisbee, conventional wisdom in the 1930s asserted that the miners who
founded the town had begun the tradition in 1880 with the town’s establishment. “There
was a great deal of Chinese litigation along the Pacific coast, and miners who came from




















4A by Texas A&M
 U
niversity C
ollege Station user on 10 August 2021
wrote Annie M. Cox, a graduate student at the University of Arizona, in her 1938 thesis.38
Contemporary evidence suggests that Bisbee was sundown by at least 1886, when the
Epitaph observed that “there are no Chinese there.”39 Even if they could not recall the
precise origins of the practice, residents of Bisbee half a century after its founding agreed
that, “with few exceptions, no Chinaman has ever allowed darkness to overtake him in the
Mule Mountains.”40
On some occasions, local newspapers documented violent attacks against the Chinese.
In the spring of 1882, white workers building a railroad near Fort Crittenden clashed
repeatedly with Chinese workers imported as cheap labor. In one of these attacks the
“white men, by firing over the heads of the Chinamen, sought to frighten them and
succeeded in doing so effectually, as [the latter] ran, leaving their tools in the road and
would not venture to return for them.”41 Weeks later, the whites marched “in a body to the
Chinese camp and ordered them to go, and upon their refusing violence was resorted to
and under the pressure of rocks and pick handles a stampede was gotten up.” After the
riot, they rounded up the Chinese, forced them onto a train, and expelled them.42 Hours
later, a train pulled into Benson carrying the banished, “as miserable looking a crowd, we
are informed, as could well be imagined.”43
Likely, whites attacked the Chinese in other unrecorded or undiscovered violent inci-
dents. However, based on the evidence, they probably deployed less physical violence
against the Chinese than they did against other groups across the country in the decades
after the Civil War. In the Northeast and the industrializing areas of the Midwest and
West, white business leaders targeted workers, often Catholic and Jewish European im-
migrants who struggled against corporations to create unions and secure rights, a struggle
that often put them at odds with the armed representatives of the state—police officers,
militiamen, and soldiers—who clubbed, beat, and shot them.44 In the South and Midwest,
racial conservatives banded together to maintain white supremacy, lynching, whipping,
raping, and generally terrorizing blacks.45 Across the West, the U.S. military, abetted by
white settlers, annihilated Indian populations or corralled them on reservations defined by
hunger, oppression, and death.46 In the Southwest, white mobs hanged and shot ethnic
Mexicans to suppress and subordinate these people. In short, during these years, whites
appealed to unbridled racism, classism, and religious bias, and used violence bordering on
warfare against those unlike themselves.47
Given the savage violence of the period, it is worth pondering why white Arizonans may
not have used greater physical violence against the Chinese, even during the hysteria of
1886. This study argues that the reasons for this were twofold. First, ordinary whites
understood, at least in some vague sense, the importance of international trade with a weak
but immense China. Second, in the context of this market-based arrangement between the
two countries, Arizona whites also recognized the leverage held by the Chinese govern-
ment to press for investigations into acts of violence against their nationals, investigations
that could result in the payment of indemnities to China by the U.S. government and—as
ordinary whites feared—in the possibility that federal authorities would punish either
individual perpetrators or the municipalities in which such violence occurred. Evidence
of that possibility was publicly available, as when, for example, the New York Herald in
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previously made against it as a result of earlier episodes of violence against the Chinese
and extract massive financial penalties.48
An incident in the Idaho Territory provides a remarkable glimpse into the fear that
whites across the West experienced over diplomatic intervention into incidents of anti-
Chinese violence. In September 1885, a mob hanged five Chinese men near Pierce City,
purportedly for the murder of a white merchant. White locals boasted of their deed. In
October, however, a Chinese delegation from Oregon arrived in Pierce City to investigate
the incident. Based on its reports from the Chinese witnesses, the delegation rejected the
white-authored story—one of besieged whites forced to defend themselves from the crim-
inal Chinese—and countered that whites had murdered the men based on racist hatred.49
Thereafter, Chinese representatives pressured the U.S. government to investigate the
incident and warned of their intention to seek indemnities.50 In mid-1886, the Portland
Oregonian reported and the Lewiston Teller prominently reprinted an article on the results
of their efforts. “The Chinese government [has] recently made a demand on the secretary
[of state] of the United States for an investigation,” it stated. “They demand money
damages.”51
Rattled by the findings of the Chinese delegation and the Chinese government’s sub-
sequent demands, white Idahoans repeatedly tailored the facts to mitigate their responsi-
bility. On October 16, 1885, the Semi-Weekly Idaho World claimed that the Chinese
delegation had endorsed the hangings and expressed “themselves satisfied . . . that the
parties who were hung were guilty.”52 As fear mounted, whites circulated another
story—possibly true—that officials had placed a white man disguised as an Indian and
conversant in Cantonese into the jail cell with the five Chinese prior to the hangings and—
probably untrue—that he had overheard them admitting to the crime.53 Once it became
clear that the Chinese would press for an indemnity, whites in Idaho and elsewhere in the
West further distanced themselves from the lynching. Now, asserted the World, they
claimed that the Nez Perce Indians had perpetrated it to avenge the killing of the white
trader with whom they had dealt as “their best friend” by lynching the Chinese merchants
who had repeatedly cheated them. Consequently, “it is thought by many that these Indians
joined with some white men determined to revenge the death of their friend.”54 When
Governor Edward A. Stevenson indicated, nine months after the incident, that he would
conduct his own investigation, the Lewiston Teller reprinted a dispatch from the Portland
Oregonian expressing its hope that he could “unravel the mystery.” In a revealing phrase,
however, that dispatch asserted that the “Indian” story, which it and like-minded whites
had now cobbled together, contained “the probable facts.”55 In another article weeks later,
it peddled the Indian story once more, insisting that “this will probably be accepted as the
correct history of the tragedy.”56 Almost thirty years later, however, the Wallace Miner, an
Idaho newspaper no longer concerned about the consequences, offered its reminiscences,
leaving no doubt that the lynching was an act of white violence against the Chinese.57
With its reference to the Idaho lynching, this study does not suggest that white Arizo-
nans knew about that incident specifically or that it shaped their behaviors. Instead, it
details the incident as a stark illustration of the influence that China did exercise and how
its intervention could impact the behavior of local white Westerners. Nonetheless, evi-
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Chinese violence could attract unwanted legal and political problems for themselves. In
fact, on March 6, 1886, the Tombstone Daily Epitaph devoted most of a page to the Chinese
demands for an indemnity related to an earlier riot in San Francisco. Citing a wire report,
the Epitaph indicated that “this was an ultimatum” and, if the United States refused to pay,
“the Chinese government [would] immediately proceed to collect the indemnity from
American citizens” operating businesses in Chinese territory. In a companion editorial
entitled “China Makes a Stand,” the Epitaph called this “grave and important news” and
added that “it is not at all surprising that such a step has been taken, by China. The only
wonder is that something of the sort has not been done before.” In a clear indication that
white Arizonans understood the lesson that the Idahoans were then learning, the Epitaph
concluded: “It will need the best efforts of our greatest minds to pilot us safely through the
dangers that now threaten. Meantime, it will be well for communities throughout
the country, to act with caution and avoid throwing unnecessary difficulties in the way
of the national government.”58
Indeed, the prominent local leaders of the Anti-Chinese Leagues were frequently at
pains to promote only nonviolent measures against “the Mongolian curse.”59 As noted
earlier, Judge Peel denounced the Chinese in Tombstone, supported the use of the boy-
cott, and eschewed the use of violence. As he put it, he “was opposed to any violence, but
believed that all hands would stand together and refus[e] to patronize any person who
employed or patronized Chinese.”60 When some members of the Tombstone League
proposed violence shortly thereafter, its president resigned, declaring his willingness “at
all times to assist by all lawful and peaceful means in the eviction of the Chinese” but
opposing any of “the extreme measures adopted by [the] Executive Committee.”61 A month
later the League issued a “Declaration of Principles” that stressed nonviolence and
acknowledged thereby the preference of a majority of its members. “We are not in favor
of unlawful methods, but so firmly are we impressed with the great importance of dis-
couraging the employment of Chinese that we recommend that they not be patronized in
any way and we will boycott any person or persons who employ Chinamen directly or
indirectly.”62 Based on a perusal of the appendices in Forgotten Dead by Carrigan and
Webb, white Arizonans had no similar qualms about lynching persons from neighboring
Mexico, a weak nation which had suffered a grievous military defeat by the United States
between 1846 and 1848, lost the northern third of its territory to the invading power, and
possessed significantly less diplomatic leverage than did distant China.63
Because the Restriction Act of 1882 applied only to immigrant laborers from China not
already in the United States and because it specifically excluded other types of Chinese
immigrants, it failed to quell the anti-Chinese sentiment. In addition, it spurred the
routine entry of many undocumented Chinese immigrants along the Mexican border,
which historian Grace Peña Delgado described as “a veritable gateway for the illegal entry
of Chinese.”64 To facilitate their entry, those seeking it turned increasingly to smuggling
rings, which could be both costly and dangerous but still offered better odds than federal
legislation and a bureaucracy designed to thwart them.65 In an essay written in 1909,
entitled “How Can We Enforce Our Exclusion Laws?,” Marcus Braun, an immigrant
inspector for the Department of Commerce and Labor in Washington, D.C., remarked
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“smuggling of Chinamen . . . is a regular profession,” he wrote, “it is not a very risky
undertaking, and it pays very well, from $25.00 to $200.00 per head. When I say that
it is not a risky undertaking,” he added, “I mean to indicate thereby that the smuggler of
Chinamen . . . very seldom crosses the border line; he merely brings his wards to the
border and he tells them to run across.”66 Historians like Robert Chao Romero and
Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen have since addressed the motivations, risks, and re-
wards associated with this practice.67
While the smugglers themselves assumed few risks, smuggling was very risky for the
Chinese.68 In 1910, the Tucson Citizen reported that “a coroner’s inquest was held this
afternoon at 3 o’clock on the case of the unidentified Chinaman whose skeleton was found
Saturday evening on the De La Canon ranch, about 35 miles southwest of [Tucson], and
a verdict was rendered that the deceased met his death by murder at the hands of persons
unknown.” The newspaper then speculated, on the basis of the available information, that
smugglers had killed him.69 Yet, given the ugly strain of anti-Chinese racism common in
Mexico, Chinese immigrants could face equally dangerous circumstances by simply re-
maining there.70
In response to the growing numbers of legal and illegal Chinese immigrants, the
perceived failure of the Restriction Act, and the escalating anti-Chinese sentiment in the
United States, the American and Chinese governments undertook to resolve their differ-
ences on immigration through negotiations. In 1888, they concluded the Bayard-Zhang
Treaty, which provided for the suspension of Chinese immigration to the United States—
“save only for merchants, students, diplomats, and laborers who had immediate family or
a thousand dollars in property or debts”—for twenty years and the denial to Chinese
laborers of their right to return to the United States following visits to China, a right
guaranteed in the Angell Treaty but now limited to only those who met specifically defined
financial thresholds or familial relationships. In return, the U.S. government agreed to
provide better protection to Chinese immigrants and their property.71 Because this treaty
was not well received in China, the U.S. government acted unilaterally, passing the Scott
Act, which banned all Chinese laborers, “whether or not they had previously resided in the
United States,” and denied Chinese immigrants visiting China the right to return unless
they met similar financial and familial conditions put forward in the Bayard-Zhang Treaty.
In so doing, it invalidated thousands of return certificates previously granted to Chinese
immigrants and denied entry to hundreds already in transit back to the United States.
However, once again it included protections for the Chinese still residing in America.72
Shortly after signing the Scott Act, President Grover Cleveland tried to placate Secretary of
State Thomas F. Bayard and the Chinese Government by successfully prevailing upon the
Congress to pay an indemnity of $276,619.75 to China, an amount negotiated originally as
part of the failed Bayard-Zhang Treaty for recent violence against the Chinese in Amer-
ica.73 Just four years after passage of the Scott Act, the U.S. government passed the Geary
Act, which not only extended the relevant provisions of the 1882 Restriction Act and the
Scott Act for another decade, but mandated as well that all the exempted classes of Chinese
living in the United States carry, at all times, resident permits (“affirmative proof”) attest-
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deportation or a year in jail.74 It then made the Geary Act permanent when it was renewed
in 1902 and affirmed in 1904 (Figure 3).75
Although traditionally weak in its relationships with the West (particularly Great Britain
and France) and increasingly so with Japan, China had negotiated a mutually beneficial
immigration and trade treaty with the United States in 1868. However, the United States
took advantage of growing Chinese weakness in 1880 when it successfully negotiated the
Angell Treaty, which uncoupled those two interests. Over the course of the next twelve
years, it succeeded in greatly limiting Chinese immigration while advancing its trade
interests in China.76 After upstart Japan humiliated China in the first Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895), the Western powers expanded their spheres of influence there. In the wake
of the war, a Western journalist concluded that China “has lost her prestige which was
nothing but the shadow of a great name; that she lies exposed as a carcass in the neigh-
borhood of which a cloud of eagles is hovering.”77 Similarly, in 1899, Secretary of State
Figure 3. In this 1889 cartoon, Uncle Sam (representing a white, male embodiment of America) attempts to
hold in place a door (symbolizing the 1888 Scott Act, one of several Chinese restrictions imposed in the
1880s) that has been broken from its hinges. Epitomizing white fears of the Chinese in this period, the cartoon
shows Chinese immigrants, rendered as grotesque and almost vermin-like caricatures, sneaking through the
broken door, the floorboards, and holes in the wall.
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John Hay tacitly acknowledged the decline of Chinese prestige when he circulated the
“Open Door Notes” to the Western powers, Russia, and Japan—in his view the countries
with a stake in China—but failed to send copies to China itself.78 Nevertheless, U.S.
policymakers still tried to avoid offending China with unbridled racist violence in the
American West because they did not wish to jeopardize their position in the world’s
largest market or provoke violence against American officials, businessmen, or mission-
aries located there, fears realized in the bloody but short-lived and peasant-led Boxer
Rebellion targeted at foreign powers and foreign influences in 1900–1901.79
Although the federal government exempted Chinese merchants and certified their
status, the officials enforcing those laws at the local level often failed to honor either. In
response to a complaint from the CCBA to the office of President William H. Taft about
local officials in Tucson interfering “with the movements of Chinese merchants,” the U.S.
secretary of commerce and labor equivocated about the difficulty the federal government
faced in its efforts to balance the malignant intentions of its immigrant legislation with its
official obligations to its trading partner, especially when the political pressure exerted by
racists at home so clearly outweighed the weakness of China abroad.80
Despite the increasingly aggressive restrictions imposed on the Chinese immigrants by
the U.S. government and the steady decline in international influence of the Chinese
government after the first Sino-Japanese War, white Arizonans remained largely cogni-
zant of the limits imposed on them by the treaty obligations between the two countries and
acted cautiously. While they continued to deploy repressive methods against the Chinese,
they avoided openly violent ones or found arguments to explain them favorably. Across the
area, for example, they maintained their local blanket bans on persons of Chinese descent,
even though they had no lawful grounds for excluding anyone on the basis of their race. As
a consequence, they achieved the desired result through the assertion of their racist rules
and the refusal of the authorities to challenge them. Writing of Bisbee, Cox recognized
that “any attempt to enforce such a rule would have been illegal, but it proved effective,
nevertheless.”81 For the local Chinese, the white residents of Bisbee sounded a bugle daily
at 4:00 P.M., reminding them to leave town posthaste; for unknown Chinese who passed
through, they made their antipathy clear by running them out of town.82
Despite the rapid growth of Bisbee in the 1890s and 1900s, the Evening Star marveled
at how strictly the residents had maintained their sundown practices. “Bisbee is . . . a
merchandise center for all the adjacent country, including northern Mexico,” it explained.
“The population, including the suburbs of Warren and Lowell, is about 20,000, 50 per
cent of whom are employed in the mines. They are almost entirely native-born Americans,
with a very few Mexicans. There are no Chinese.”83 Bisbee was so closely identified with
anti-Chinese practices that, when it announced a baseball tournament in 1905, the Tucson
Citizen joked that “it may be stated here that no visiting team will be fed at a Chink
restaurant.”84
In Tombstone, whites feared a “Chinese invasion” and worked tirelessly to “oust” the
few Chinese who settled there. Delgado explained that “the tenor of anti-Chinese agitation
was much more subdued than in . . . Bisbee, but in all cases the outcomes were the same.”
Eschewing violence, the white business and working classes in Tombstone united to keep
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city leaders “adamantly opposed acts of bloodshed and murder. Good citizens, [one of
them] asserted, must take a positive stand against such heinousness. [He] believed in the
promises made by Chinese launderers to leave Tombstone once they were ready or ‘when
the washing gave out.’”85 With this assertion, this community leader affirmed the point
made earlier, that influential whites feared that violent acts against the Chinese could
provoke serious repercussions for the perpetrators and the community at large.
It is tempting to see Bisbee and Douglas as sundown towns because of their complete
ban on Chinese people, but not Tombstone and Clifton, since both towns tolerated at least
some Chinese. However, it is more appropriate to view them all as sundown towns, with
varying degrees of strictness determined by local labor needs. Local demand for cheap
labor provided some measure of safety for some Chinese—especially when influential
people deemed a degree of tolerance necessary. In my recent study of anti-black violence
in the Midwest, I expanded the theoretical understanding of sundown towns in a passage
that might equally apply to anti-Chinese sundown towns in the Arizona Territory: “Even in
the strictest sundown jurisdictions, however, whites occasionally allowed a limited num-
ber of blacks for very particular reasons.”86 I found that mobs or police officers would
repeatedly drive out most—if not all—blacks when their numbers spiked beyond what
whites regarded as an acceptable threshold. Before long, a few blacks would again collect
in small numbers in search of work, beginning the process anew.
With the support of immigration officials and their collusion with the local authorities,
whites in Clifton kept the Chinese off-balance with raids on their community and depor-
tation proceedings against individuals, as permitted under the Geary Act. “A couple of
interesting Chinese cases were tried before U.S. Commissioner Reshau in Clifton last
week,” the Copper Era reported in 1902. “The chinks had been arrested for being illegally
within the domain of Uncle Sam.” Endorsing the vigorous prosecution of one case, the
newspaper betrayed its pleasure at the result. One of the Chinese tried “had been in this
country many years, as he spoke English very well.” Nevertheless, the “commissioner held
[him] guilty, hence [he] will be deported to China.”87 In 1909, whites there pressed for the
deportation of eight Chinese residents, including Quong Wo, “who claims that he has
lived in Clifton for 12 years and who objects to being sent back to his native land.”
Betraying its attitude toward the Clifton deportations, the Tucson Citizen headlined its
story “Chinks Don’t Want to Vamos.”88
In Clifton, too, white officials seemed disinclined to investigate or punish anti-Chinese
crimes. Rather than admit the racist violence against the Chinese, they framed these
attacks as robberies. “A brutal murder occurred at the Chinese garden a few miles above
Clifton Friday,” reported the Copper Era in 1903. When two Chinese came to town to trade,
someone raided their residence, stole their money, and killed Young Chew, an elderly man
who had stayed at home. “A coroner’s jury was impaneled by Justice Boyles, which
returned a verdict to the effect that death had been caused by knife wounds inflicted by
parties unknown.” Noting that Chew was “very popular” among the Chinese (likely
a euphemism for community leader), the newspaper added that the authorities had “made
no arrests” but had supposedly “been vigilant since the murder.” It then ended its report
by placing much of the blame for the crime on the victims themselves and by justifying its
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been a prey to outlaws, and it would seem that they should eventually learn that the safest
place to keep their money is in the banks. Chinese gardeners have been robbed and
murdered in all sections of this country.”89 By claiming that Chew had been killed in
a robbery-gone-wrong and that he had brought the killing upon himself by keeping his
money at home, the Copper Era minimized the possibility that Chinese officials would
investigate the case. In addition, by claiming that similar incidents were both common and
widespread, it hinted at the likelihood that white newspapers and public officials else-
where likewise recognized the merits of obscuring the nature of these killings.
Like their counterparts in neighboring cities, whites in Douglas were determined to
keep their city free of the Chinese. Shortly after two Chinese men entered town on
business in 1902, a white mob formed, manhandled the visitors, stole their money, and
then purchased rounds of drinks for the white townspeople. Unequivocally, the mob
delivered a crystal-clear message about its intention to keep Douglas sundown; the Copper
Era reaffirmed their message by headlining its story “No Chinamen Wanted.” Immedi-
ately after the incident occurred, a prominent white man—aware perhaps of the potential
consequences of such violent acts—put the two victims up in a hotel until they could leave
town safely the next morning. Notably too, the author of the newspaper account wrote it in
a vague, jokey, and euphemistic way—one that would amuse knowing readers, maintain
plausible deniability, and minimize any legal jeopardy to the town or its residents. The
entire account read as follows:
Two sleek celestials dropped down in Douglas the other day with a view to business,
and the show down they got for their money would curl the paint on a water bucket.
A couple of prominent citizens organized a party to show the distinguished stran-
gers around town, and the way they looked after their job was remarkable. They
started from the Hotel Ord. There are thirty-one saloons in that salubrious burg, and
the pig tails were enlightened as to the interior arrangement of every one of them
and compelled to treat as the price of their information. The crowd swelled as it
proceeded till the chinks, towards the last, had to dive to the bottom of their baggy
pants to settle with the bar. When they had been shown all the artistic intricacies of
business life in Douglas, they were advised to sell their certificates and go. They were
even given a start when Captain Rynning took them to a hotel over night and saw
them depart in peace the next morning.90
In late 1909 or early 1910, influential landowners in Cochise County began to backslide
on their long-standing insistence on Chinese exclusion and to recruit Chinese as the
cheapest available labor. Shortly thereafter, an unknown number of Chinese laborers
apparently responded affirmatively. Many local whites reacted angrily against the ranchers
they considered responsible for a Chinese invasion and to the threat anti-sundown land-
owners posed to the county’s long-standing traditions. The Bisbee Daily Review gave voice
to the white rage. “In Douglas and in Bisbee and the Country surrounding both cities
Chinese have been noticeably absent,” it mused. “In Bisbee Chinamen were always barred
and such was also the case in Douglas. No Chinaman restaurants and laundries were to be
seen in either city and the surrounding districts were imbued with the same anti-Oriental
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[sic] away.” The Review also addressed the breach among the ranchers when it asserted that
“there were signs appearing of a threatening race trouble in the Sulphur Springs valley,”
with some ranchers “aroused at what they fear is an invasion of Chinese labor.” According
to the paper, pro-sundown ranchers vowed that they would “not stand for an Asiatic
invasion and that newly arrived Chinese must go.” In addition, they asserted that “they
will see that white labor is used in this section.”91
Given the aggressive response of pro-sundown ranchers, it is unclear who among them
might have been responsible for the “invasion.” Since the area was amid an overall
population boom, some of those importing the Chinese workers may have been new-
comers unacclimated to the sundown traditions in the area.92 Others may have been local
ranchers who had met the competitive challenge introduced by the newcomers but had
quickly disavowed it as soon as the uproar over the immigrant labor erupted.
Coincident with the reported Chinese influx in Cochise County, white men killed two
Chinese laborers in separate incidents across the region. In December 1909 near Clifton,
Antonio Nardelli—likely a person of Italian descent and one whose whiteness under other
circumstances might have been in dispute—killed Lem King (or Lin Kong), a cook. The
Copper Era observed that local white sentiment was decidedly with the shooter. Nardelli
claimed King had attacked him with a knife and that he had responded in self-defense.
The only other witness was a bookkeeper named W. E. Kelly. Although asleep nearby
“when the shooting occurred, [he] testified at the preliminary trial at Clifton that he heard
the Chinaman speak several words before the shot was fired, but that he did not see
anything until after the man was dead.” With its convoluted language, the Copper Era
hinted that the authorities and jurors had strained to arrive at their decision: “The coroners
[sic] jury rendered a verdict exhonerating [sic] Nardelli, as it appeared to them that the
killing was done in self defense.”93 At the trial conducted in April 1910 and pursued at the
behest of the Chinese community, a jury freed Nardelli despite physical evidence indicat-
ing he had shot the alleged knife-wielder in the back—a difficult fact to reconcile with the
gunman’s claim of self-defense.94
In a letter sent after the trial to Carroll Cook in San Francisco, Lew Beck Chang of
Clifton explained that Nardelli had been freed through “bribe and corruption” and that the
prosecutor hired by the Chinese had been “a bad attorney” who had “work for both side.”95
In a second letter signed by “All Chinese citizens of Clifton,” Chang wrote: “We ask you
tell us what can we do for him if have any chance or any way can rearrest the defendant we
will do it wish you give us advise before we do anything we all anxious to hear from you.”
Noting that the killing and the white support for it had only amplified already elevated
racist hatred, Chang told Cook “we need you [to] help us” because, in his words, “if this
defendant not convict all Chinese in this district be no protection cannot live here at all.”96
In reply, Cook conceded that the Chinese could expect no justice. “I am very sorry to hear
that Lem King’s alleged murderer was turned loose. If he was tried before a Jury, and the
Jury rendered a verdict finding him not guilty, there is nothing more that can be done. It is
too bad, but there is nothing more that you can do at all.”97 Despite the irregularities in the
legal process, the coroner’s jury and the trial jury afforded Nardelli and the white residents
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Chinese officials, an outcome which Cook acknowledged with certitude to his Chinese
clients after the trial.
Then, in September 1910, an “American” (white) man robbed and shot two Chinese
gardeners traveling near Bisbee, killing one and injuring the other. The Bisbee Daily Review
claimed that “reports differ as to the circumstances leading to the shooting. One report is
that the Chineman [sic] who was shot made a move as if to grapple with the robber after he
had secured the money. Another is that the highwayman shot down the man and his
companion without the least provocation.”98 Regardless of the differences in the reports
on the incident, the local authorities seemed disinclined to undertake a serious investiga-
tion, as the Review made clear: “The residents of Hereford notified Sheriff Jack White, of
Tombstone, of the robbery and murder and he in return notified Constable McRae of
[Bisbee]. Officer McRae started to Hereford on horseback and went as far as the San Pedro
river. He did not secure any trace of the slayer. Ranchers along that vicinity had been
previously advised of the affair and kept a diligent search for the fugitive, but secured no
trace of him.”99
Furthermore, in a letter to the Cochise County district attorney in Douglas after this
“robbery,” Cook wrote that concerned parties had requested that he “write to you, relative
to the murder of a Chinaman in your County, named Fong Gee King, to ascertain whether
you have yet any clew [sic] to the murderer, and if so, whether in the presentation of the
cause you desire any assistance.” Cook also advised him that the CCBA was “an Associ-
ation to which all Chinese in the United States are entitled to appeal for assistance and
where one of their number has been murdered they are ready to lend any assistance
possible towards the prosecution of the murderer.” Cook volunteered his organization’s
assistance “either in the detection of the murderer of the Chinaman or in the prosecution
of him, if arrested.” If the district attorney replied to Cook, there is no record of it.100
As they had elsewhere, the officials in Cochise County, its residents, and the regional
press reacted to this killing in a way that downplayed anti-Chinese violence and minimized
thereby any potentially negative consequences that might result from it. In a period when
whites normally pursued alleged crimes by minorities with the formation of posses that
hunted for fugitives and often rounded up large numbers of loosely defined “suspects,”
they reacted in Cochise County to the killing of a Chinese resident in a wholly lackluster
way. By dispatching a single lawman on horseback across a wide area in a fruitless search
for suspects, by maintaining a “diligent search for the fugitive” by local ranchers, by
keeping the investigation in the hands of the local district attorney, and by publicizing
their efforts positively in the local press, the white community did what was necessary to
achieve their racist objectives and make a Chinese investigation unlikely. Coincidently,
a week after the killing, the Bisbee Daily Review reported that law enforcement officials and
ranchers managed to scramble a sizable party to pursue those suspected of a property
crime against wealthy local white residents: “Horses Lost by Ranchers,” it screamed:
“Posse Is Out.”101
Cook’s correspondence regarding the murder cases involving Chinese immigrants near
Clifton and Bisbee provides additional evidence of China’s continued willingness—despite
its diminished stature—to intervene in incidents of anti-Chinese violence, elevating the
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Gillett, protesting agitation by organized white anti-immigrant groups in San Jose, Cook
emphasized that China was likely to elevate similar issues diplomatically. He warned the
governor that the Chinese consul general “has requested me to prepare this correspon-
dence to be sent to the Chinese Minister at Washington that, through him, it may be
brought to the attention of the State Department.” In signing off, the CCBA counsel
added: “Hoping that you may find some way to [persuade] the authorities [in San Jose]
to interfere with this unlawful interference with the business of the citizens of a friendly
nation.”102
This study advances the scholarship by answering the two unaddressed questions stated
in the introduction. First, why did whites use such radically different—and less openly
violent—methods toward the Chinese in the American West than they did toward other
racial minorities there? Second, why did this matter? In response to the first question, this
work finds that whites took a less violent (and often overtly “peaceful”) approach to the
Chinese immigrants because they recognized the importance of their recourse to the
protections negotiated between their internationally weak but economically important
homeland and the economic opportunities and political influence to the United States.
Whites did not choose to use “subtler” methods against the Chinese than they did against
blacks, ethnic Mexicans, or Indians; they simply capitulated to circumstances beyond their
control. While the United States was inclined to show less respect for China after the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895, it still sought to bolster its economic and political influence in that
country and to avoid anti-American reprisals against its own citizens. Accordingly, federal
authorities tried to keep local officials attentive to the need to avoid racist violence against
Chinese immigrants.
In the Arizona Territory, whites—particularly influential whites—opted in most in-
stances for cruel but nonviolent methods of repression because they recognized that they
or their municipalities could face serious consequences for acts of overt violence. Aside
from the occasional act of mob violence or individual homicides, they usually responded
with collective anti-Chinese intimidation through Anti-Chinese Leagues, anti-Chinese
meetings, and economic boycotts devised to drive the Chinese away. Judges clearly hostile
to Chinese immigrants opposed violence against them, and the president of the Tomb-
stone Anti-Chinese League resigned in protest in response to members advocating it. In
towns like Clifton, Bisbee, and Douglas, local officials and juries manipulated investiga-
tions and the law to create plausible deniability and thereby protect white residents and
their communities from liability. The white press routinely crafted stories that used
robberies-gone-wrong scenarios to obscure white violence, and “humor” to mask what
appeared to be a beating and robbery of two Chinese businessmen.
Outside Arizona, whites were similarly aware of and fearful about the consequences of
white violence against Chinese immigrants. In 1885, those in Idaho—initially proud of
their handiwork—lost little time in distancing themselves from the lynching of five Chi-
nese victims and in concocting absurd stories about the incident once they learned that the
Chinese government was investigating it, demanding indemnities, and requesting action
by the U.S. government. During the height of the national frenzy against the Chinese in
1886, the New York Herald bemoaned the amount of the indemnity already owed by the
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was under tremendous political pressure internally and externally, Carroll Cook wielded
the threat of Chinese diplomatic intervention to spur investigations into anti-Chinese
incidents or deter subsequent acts of violence in places like Arizona and California. While
influential whites in the Arizona Territory may not have been aware of any or all of these
particular warnings, they were, as their actions demonstrated, clearly aware of the checks
on white supremacy.
In response to the second question—Why did this matter?—this study shows that white
racists were fundamentally rational in their approach to the enforcement of white suprem-
acy. While historians often imply that racist mobs possessed unlimited agency in the
United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, forming at will and wreak-
ing unchecked havoc, this work shows that whites understood the limitations on their
power. They revealed that understanding in their different approaches to different minor-
ities, dispensing unrestrained violence against blacks, ethnic Mexicans, and Indians but
showing considerably more deference to the Chinese. Even though China was a weak state
and one that weakened dramatically during the study period, Chinese diplomats enjoyed
leverage over U.S. policymakers who sought to expand the “open door” trade relationship
with China while minimizing the payment of indemnities to China and avoiding the
possibility of reprisals against Americans in China. In this sense, this work echoes the
conclusions of an earlier study of the “subtler” types of violence used by whites against
Japanese nationals and the simultaneous use of extreme violence against Mexican na-
tionals in Texas in the early 1920s. The possibility of death there for foreign nationals
at the hands of American mobs was directly related to the power and influence wielded by
the governments in their countries of origin and to the potential consequences for the U.S.
government and, by extension, for the perpetrators. This advantage was clearly unavailable
to most African Americans.103
In addition, this study provides several interventions into the historiography. First, by
examining the southeastern Arizona Territory, it shifts the focus of anti-Chinese racism
away from the American West Coast, which has received the most study, and onto an
under-investigated area. In this sense, it builds on the work of scholars such as Liping
Zhu, Stephanie Hinnershitz, Julian Lim, and Grace Peña Delgado, all of whom have
focused on places ranging from the Rocky Mountains to the U.S. Southeast and the
U.S.-Mexico borderlands.104
Second, this study shifts the focus from sundown towns in anti-black municipalities in
the Northeast, Midwest, and West to anti-Chinese municipalities in the Southwest—thus
confirming that, despite hopes of escaping their West Coast oppression, the Chinese did
not decide of their own volition that Arizona was an undesirable place to settle. Given the
prevalence of sundown towns in Arizona, scholars should identify and investigate them
systematically, as scholars of African American history have begun to do, to determine
how and why sundown towns developed in the Southwest. By exposing anti-Chinese
practices in sundown towns, they will help to clarify why so many people of color lived
(and continue to live) in big cities and coastal areas, and why so few live in the vast and
overwhelmingly white areas of rural America. Many observers, past and present, attribute
this reality to the alleged free choice of people of color who supposedly had some natural
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outcome was the direct result of conservative, pro-sundown whites expelling people of
color from their environs, creating small pockets of racial diversity surrounded by large
areas of whiteness—population patterns that still powerfully shape demographic, ideolog-
ical, and political patterns in the present.
Third, this work affirms Lew-Williams’s assertion that scholars must expand their
definitions of racist violence beyond lynchings and massacres before they can offer any
comprehensive understanding of the white supremacist violence that seized the United
States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Next to these murderous acts,
as she notes, “Chinese expulsions seem insignificant” or “appear not to be violent at all.”
Yet, by particularizing them as this study does, it becomes apparent that these expulsions
played similar roles in extending white supremacy and other forms of social control, while
reflecting the limits that the Chinese state imposed upon the exercise of white power.
Finally, this study challenges the assumption that the 1880s marked a frenzied climax
of national anti-Chinese sentiment and anti-Chinese mob violence. Throughout the
period, whites in the Arizona Territory were aggressive and creative in their efforts to
block Chinese settlement and labor competition. From a historiographical perspective, this
study argues that no conclusion regarding a climax of anti-Chinese violence can be estab-
lished until the archival data have been sufficiently mined. This concern can be reinforced
by recalling the certainty that once surrounded the scholarly appraisal of a now largely
discredited anti-black “lynching era” that ran, supposedly, from 1880 until 1930.105 Carroll
Cook alluded to this possibility when he documented raging anti-Chinese agitation in San
Jose, California, in 1910 and lamented that, according to the Chinese with whom he had
spoken there, “matters are getting worse instead of better.”106
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